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Solving the Puzzle of Transnational Class Actions 
KEVIN M. CLERMONT* 
Zachary Clopton’s article1 does an excellent job of sketching this puzzle: how 
should a U.S. class action treat proposed foreign class members in a circumstance 
where any resulting judgment will likely not bind those absentees abroad? Two 
approaches occupy opposite ends of the spectrum of ways to treat the foreign 
absentees: the exclusionary and the inclusionary approaches. He capably surveys 
the case law and the commentary, which generally lean toward excluding those 
absentees from the class.2 He then properly stresses both the fairly low risk of 
relitigation3 and also the values of deterrence and compensation that the 
exclusionary approach sacrifices.4 Finally, he proposes an inclusive solution to 
retrieve those values.5 That final step is where I believe his fine article goes 
somewhat astray. 
The puzzle appears most starkly in a Federal Rule 23(b)(3) class action for 
antitrust or securities damages from a foreign defendant. Given a favorable 
territorial reach of substantive law and an otherwise proper class action, the 
proposed class might include, in addition to American plaintiffs, some foreigners 
who dealt with the foreign defendant outside the United States.6 A class recovery 
normally covers the whole class with finality, while a loss by the class binds all 
members of the certified class. If a class member were to sue again, res judicata 
should ensure these results. But if the class member subsequently sues in a foreign 
court, these results would depend on the foreign court recognizing the American 
class judgment and applying American notions of res judicata. Unfortunately, most 
courts of the world do not so preclude a passive class member who has not 
accepted a payout.7 The foreign court usually refuses recognition either on the 
ground of public policy or on the ground that the U.S. court lacked the personal 
jurisdiction required to bind a passive class member. The foreigners can thus 
threaten to sue again abroad and extort a sizable nuisance, individual, or group 
recovery there, either by settlement or by judgment. 
                                                                                                             
 
 * Ziff Professor of Law, Cornell University. I thank Zach Clopton for his reactions 
and insights. 
 1. Zachary D. Clopton, Transnational Class Actions in the Shadow of Preclusion, 90 
IND. L.J. 1387 (2015). His article’s marvelous country-by-country appendix appears online 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2609339. 
 2. Id. at 1392–400. 
 3. Id. at 1400–06. 
 4. Id. at 1409–10. 
 5. Id. at 1414–20. 
 6. The puzzle is usually stated in terms that use “foreigner.” Clopton usefully observes 
that the real concern is any passive class member who could effectively bring the same cause 
of action in a foreign court. See id. at 1403–04, 1415 n.159.  
 7. See, e.g., Richard Fentiman, Recognition, Enforcement and Collective Judgments, in 
CROSS-BORDER CLASS ACTIONS: THE EUROPEAN WAY 85 (Arnaud Nuyts & Nikitas E. 
Hatzimihail eds., 2014); Andrea Pinna, Recognition and Res Judicata of US Class Action 
Judgments in European Legal Systems, 1 ERASMUS L. REV. 31 (2008). 
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USUAL SOLUTION 
In 2003, I consulted on this puzzle in an antitrust class action. Strangely, the 
puzzle had rarely blipped on anyone’s radar screen.8 So, on the basis of a few 
cases9 and oblique scholarly comment,10 I concluded that even if the U.S. class-
action court were willing to certify a class that included foreign claimants, the risk 
of relitigation should render defendants unwilling to settle for big bucks. In 2014, I 
advised in a securities class action presenting this puzzle. In the intervening decade 
between these forays into research, two developments had transpired: scholars had 
written a lot more on the now-discovered puzzle,11 and foreign countries had 
                                                                                                             
 
 8. For explanation of why the puzzle had not come to much attention, see Clopton, 
supra note 1, at 1392 n.18, 1398 n.62. 
 9. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 996 (2d Cir. 1975) 
(excluding foreigners from class action, after quoting the district judge: “if defendants 
prevail against a class they are entitled to a victory no less broad than a defeat would have 
been”); In re Lloyd’s Am. Trust Fund Litig., No. 96 CIV. 1262 (RWS), 1998 WL 50211, at 
*15 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1998) (certifying class with foreigners, while conceding that 
“Citibank provides as evidence the declarations of foreign counsel, which in sum conclude 
that many, if not all, of the foreign Names could sue Citibank a second time in their home 
jurisdictions on the very same claims, even if they are unsuccessful here. The law surveyed 
includes five jurisdictions, which are France, England, South Africa, Canada, and 
Switzerland, and which represent approximately 58 percent of the proposed class.”); In re 
U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 69 F.R.D. 24, 48–54 (S.D. Cal. 1975) (certifying class with foreigners, 
while conceding that many expert affidavits, including affidavits treating France, West 
Germany, Luxembourg, Norway, Great Britain, Belgium, Switzerland, and Italy, said that a 
class-action judgment, without an opt-in procedure, would have no res judicata effect 
abroad). 
 10. See, e.g., John C.L. Dixon, The Res Judicata Effect in England of a US Class Action 
Settlement, 46 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 134, 150 (1997) (predicting rosily that a U.S. class action 
judgment has a “good chance of being upheld in England” as long the absentee received 
actual notice of the opt-out right); Richard O. Faulk, Armageddon Through Aggregation? 
The Use and Abuse of Class Actions in International Dispute Settlement, 37 TORT & INS. L.J. 
999, 1005–15 (2002) (discussing the incompatibility of the U.S. class-action device with 
civil-law judicial traditions and noting that the “group actions” in some civil-law countries 
are not class actions in the Rule 23 sense). 
 11. Most of the literature aligns with the exclusionary viewpoint. See, e.g., Michael P. 
Murtagh, The Rule 23(b)(3) Superiority Requirement and Transnational Class Actions: 
Excluding Foreign Class Members in Favor of European Remedies, 34 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 1, 3 (2011) (advocating “the exclusion of foreign class members from opt-out 
class actions where it is unclear whether the foreign courts would give res judicata effect to 
the judgment”); Rhonda Wasserman, Transnational Class Actions and Interjurisdictional 
Preclusion, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313 (2011); Gary W. Johnson, Note, Rule 23 and the 
Exclusion of Foreign Citizens as Class Members in U.S. Class Actions, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 
963 (2012); John C. Coffee Jr., Global Class Actions, NAT’L L.J., June 11, 2007, at 12. But 
see Ilana T. Buschkin, Note, The Viability of Class Action Lawsuits in a Globalized 
Economy—Permitting Foreign Claimants to Be Members of Class Action Lawsuits in the 
U.S. Federal Courts, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1563, 1600 (2005) (“Given the difficulties of 
bringing small-claim lawsuits in the courts of most foreign countries, the presumption must 
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moved to adopt their own pallid versions of class actions.12 However, as Clopton 
agrees, neither development has changed judges’ and litigants’ approaches in the 
United States, except to make all persons more aware of the puzzle and hence more 
wary of including foreign claimants.13 Nor have these developments changed my 
view that, one way or another, transnational class-action damages usually do not 
accrue to the foreign claimants. The exclusionary approach thus dominates. 
Exclusion conforms to modern U.S. class-action theory, built on the idea that 
the class and the defendant should face equal risks and rewards. The court should 
not award recovery to a class member who is not bound. Although the Constitution 
permits14 or sometimes even requires15 unequal treatment of the parties, the rule 
makers decided the aggregation idea in Rule 23 should not go so far as to 
transgress the equal treatment typical of civil process.16  
Moreover, the court should not award huge damages just to deter. I am not 
saying that the class action cannot embody deterrent aims that go beyond 
compensatory aims.17 Courts can and sometimes do pursue deterrent aims, as in the 
                                                                                                             
be in favor of permitting the foreign claimants to join the class.”); cf. Hannah L. Buxbaum, 
Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law: Managing Jurisdictional 
Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 14, 69 (2007) (including only foreigners who 
purchased securities in the United States). 
 12. See MULTI-PARTY REDRESS MECHANISMS IN EUROPE: SQUEAKING MICE? (V. Harsagi 
& C.H. van Rhee eds., 2014); WORLD CLASS ACTIONS (Paul G. Karlsgodt ed., 2012); 
Hannah L. Buxbaum, Class Actions, Conflict and the Global Economy, 21 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 585, 586–87 (2014); Edward F. Sherman, Group Litigation Under Foreign 
Legal Systems: Variations and Alternatives to American Class Actions, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 
401, 402 (2002) (surveying several countries and concluding that their class-action 
“procedures fall short of the broad sweep of the contemporary American class action with its 
incentives to litigate on behalf of a class”).  
 13. See Clopton, supra note 1, at 1396–98 (collecting cases). 
 14. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (authorizing nonmutual 
issue preclusion). 
 15. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (requiring clear and convincing 
evidence when terminating parental rights). 
 16. One of the principal aims of the 1966 amendment to Federal Rule 23 was to extend 
preclusion to all class members while eliminating so-called one-way intervention, by which 
some courts had allowed otherwise-unbound absentees to intervene after a favorable 
decision on the merits. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3) advisory committee’s note (1966). 
Likewise, in recognition of the principle of even-handedness, courts deny nonmutual issue 
preclusion to absentees who chose to opt out of the class. See Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. 
Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 814 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1987); Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing 
Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 
81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 391 n.136 (1967) (“[I]t would be anomalous to give one who opts out 
collateral estoppel benefits of the action from which he deliberately removed himself.”).  
 17. Compare Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937 
(1975), with Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and 
Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47 (1975). 
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arguably authorized process of fluid recovery,18 but they do not currently have the 
authority to pursue those deterrent aims at the expense of equal treatment.19 
Exclusion does not solve the puzzle, of course. It just decides how we will live 
with it. Courts and parties can take additional steps to mitigate the deleterious 
effects of the puzzle. The exclusionary approach thus might come with minor 
variations, which move toward the inclusionary approach:  
First, the court could, and often does, examine the range of class members and 
include in the class those foreigners who would face preclusion abroad or who, as a 
practical matter, are not likely to sue again.20 But this approach requires a lot of 
research to reach a result that ultimately will give the defendant cold comfort.21  
Second, the court could create an opt-in class, so that foreigners who want to 
benefit from the class action must consent to party status. The court would then 
exclude all non-opt-in foreigners from the class. Foreign law is more likely to 
recognize any resulting judgment when foreign parties consent to inclusion in the 
class.22 But U.S. law does not favor opt-in classes.23 In any event few foreigners 
                                                                                                             
 
 18. See RICHARD H. FIELD, BENJAMIN KAPLAN, KEVIN M. CLERMONT & CATHERINE T. 
STRUVE, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 919 n.h (11th ed. 2014). 
 19. This same idea of Rule 23 as using only a portion of broad constitutional 
authorization explains the cases that interpret the Rule as more demanding than the 
Constitution on adequate representation. See KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 412, 483–85, 498–505 (4th ed. 2015). 
 20. See, e.g., Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 289 F.R.D. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(taking the analysis down to the level of class members from the Pitcairn Island), rev’d on 
other grounds sub nom. St. Stephen’s School v. Pricewaterhousecoopers Accountants N.V., 
570 F. App’x 37 (2d Cir. 2014). But see Tanya J. Monestier, Transnational Class Actions 
and the Illusory Search for Res Judicata, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1, 20 (2011) (“It is submitted, 
however, that U.S. courts are not positioned to predict accurately the preclusive effect of 
U.S. class judgments abroad owing to both the litigation and structural dynamics of class 
proceedings.”).  
 21. See Linda Sandstrom Simard & Jay Tidmarsh, Foreign Citizens in Transnational 
Class Actions, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 124 (2011) (broadening the focus from preclusion to 
the general question of incentive to sue abroad, and doing a cost-benefit analysis to create a 
complicated approach that begins with the rule that the U.S. “court should presumptively 
include foreign citizens when they assert small-stakes claims”). 
 22. See Monestier, supra note 20, at 7 (“An opt-in class action for foreign claimants 
eliminates the res judicata problem altogether because a foreign claimant who has 
affirmatively evidenced his intent to be bound to a result (through the act of opting in) 
cannot later challenge the authority of the adjudicating court to render judgment against him. 
An opt-in mechanism for foreign plaintiffs also provides several advantages over the current 
opt-out mechanism: it allows all foreign claimants to participate in U.S. litigation if they so 
choose; it provides additional due process protections for absent foreign claimants; it 
respects international comity; and it sufficiently deters defendant misconduct.”). 
 23. See 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1787, at 522–25 (3d ed. 2005); cf. John Bronsteen, 
Class Action Settlements: An Opt-in Proposal, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 903 (arguing in favor of 
opt-in for class settlements but not for class adjudications, in order to discourage both 
parties’ collusion and frivolous suits). 
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will come forward to opt in, and thus the class action will still seriously under-
deter. 
Third, the court might offer the defendant the protection of releases from the 
foreigners. This route would involve accepting the unfairness of including the 
foreigners in the class. After recovery by way of adjudication or settlement, those 
foreigners who submit a proof of claim or accept payment should be bound, even in 
foreign courts.24 The court would also require a release from each of these 
participating class members.25 This approach adds a contractual defense to the res 
judicata defense, working to stop any new suit brought by those members who not 
only participated in the payout but also signed a release.26 But this step retains the 
inclusionary defect of requiring the defendant to pay full damages without 
precluding further action by the vast number of foreign class members who do not 
participate or sign a release. 
Fourth, as the price for any inclusionary approach, the defendant could seek 
indemnity from the plaintiffs against any follow-up suits, payable out of the 
plaintiffs’ class recovery. But, unsurprisingly, plaintiffs are not eager to embrace 
that liability.  
Fifth, the defendant could seek an antisuit injunction to stop class members from 
suing again. Although U.S. law would overcome its usual disfavor of antisuit 
injunctions when a court is trying to effectuate its judgment,27 and under U.S. law 
the court would have sufficient jurisdiction over the class members,28 the defendant 
needs to find a way to enforce the injunction against persons and assets in the 
United States because foreign countries would no more recognize the injunction 
than the class judgment. The injunction might therefore do little more than inhibit 
some U.S.-based class members from suing again. 
Sixth, the defendant could conceivably launder a class judgment rendered by a 
U.S. court (“F1”) that included foreign class members. The defendant could sue on 
the judgment in a receptive foreign country (“F2”) for a declaration of preclusion 
against a class of those foreign class members, and then seek to enforce the foreign 
judgment in another country (“F3”) bound to recognize F2’s judgments. But there 
are few countries that would serve as F2, and even European Union countries as F3 
                                                                                                             
 
 24. The idea is that voluntary settlement overcomes the foreign courts’ public policy 
reticence, and that voluntary appearance provides personal jurisdiction over the foreign 
claimants. See Debra Lyn Bassett, U.S. Class Actions Go Global: Transnational Class 
Actions and Personal Jurisdiction, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 41 (2003). 
 25. See 3 WILLIAM RUBENSTEIN, ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON 
CLASS ACTIONS § 13:3 (5th ed. 2011). A better discussion appears in § 12.15 of the book’s 
third edition in 1992. 
 26. See, e.g., CODE CIV. art. 2052 (Fr.) (speaking of settlement agreements, the statute 
provides: “Les transactions ont, entre les parties, l’autorité de la chose jugée en dernier 
ressort.”).  
 27. See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN 
UNITED STATES COURTS 567 n.38, 586–87 (5th ed. 2011). 
 28. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 177 F.R.D. 216, 229 
(D.N.J. 1997) (involving huge class action against life insurer for fraudulent sales practices). 
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would likely invoke public policy in refusing to recognize fellow-member F2’s 
judgment based on a U.S. class action.29 
CLOPTON SOLUTION 
Despite all these suggested half measures, the puzzle remains unsolved. This 
situation moves Clopton to suggest another solution, for which he jumps to the 
inclusionary end of the solution spectrum and proposes what he calls “private 
preclusion.”30 However, we can better understand the proposal as a kind of release. 
It is a contractual solution, not one that uses the law of preclusion. 
Clopton sees the parties using their superior knowledge to price a release, 
usually at certification but perhaps at termination, whereby the foreign class 
members would relinquish their right to sue again. For example, based on a 
supposition that the risk of relitigation in Austrian courts is higher than in 
Germany, Clopton contrasts offers promising Austrian option holders “a thirty 
percent premium on top of the U.S. recovery in exchange for a release” with offers 
of “only a ten percent premium to German option holders.”31 The court would 
notify the foreigners of these offers by normal class-action notice procedure. 
His solution, then, has two key features. First, the U.S. court would certify a 
class that includes the foreigners. Second, the defendant would offer the foreigners 
a bounty to sign a release. Those two features produce two major defects in the 
proposal. 
First, Clopton rejects any exclusionary approach in favor of inclusiveness. That 
is, the recovery provides damages calculated for all the foreigners. Distributing 
those damages will be a problem, necessitating some kind of fluid recovery.32 
Some foreigners will sign releases. Yet nonsigning and nonclaiming foreigners can 
sue again. In other words, almost all the unfairness, overcompensation, and 
overdeterrence of inclusion survives under Clopton’s solution. 
Second, to provide greater relief from repetitive litigation, Clopton suggests that 
the defendant offer a bribe to the foreigners to sign a release against suing again. 
This proposal highlights the unfairness and other defects in a number of ways.  
                                                                                                             
 
 29. See Brussels Reg., No. 1215/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 351/1) art. 45(1)(a). 
 30. See Clopton, supra note 1, at 1414. He also suggests a couple of alternative 
solutions, but they will seldom be available. They include pre-dispute forum selection, see 
id. at 1413–14, and judicial cooperation between the U.S. court and foreign courts, see id. at 
1421.  
 31. Id. at 1415. 
 32. See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23, § 1784, at 336–43 (describing judicial 
hostility); cf. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION 
§ 3.07 (2010) (arguing that a greater judicial power exists to approve such cy pres relief by 
settlement than exists to order such relief by adjudication, and rejecting the option of 
returning unclaimed funds to the defendant because it “would undermine the deterrence 
function of class actions and the underlying substantive-law basis of the recovery by 
rewarding the alleged wrongdoer simply because distribution to the class would not be 
viable”). 
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In the event of a recovery in the U.S. action, signing foreigners will receive the 
base recovery, which presumably was set as a fair compensation; indeed, the U.S. 
recovery probably exceeded the level of recovery obtainable in any foreign court 
system. In addition, these foreigners will get a generous percentage bonus for 
signing away the right to sue again, a right that had vaporized upon their appearing 
in the U.S. action (remember that the only foreigners able to sue again are those 
who were absent class members and who did nothing to join the class). To my 
mind, it is hard to champion a solution that awards more than fair compensation. 
Meanwhile, the defendant pays full recovery to the class that includes all the 
foreigners plus the bonuses to the signing foreigners. This is unfair. The defendant 
is buying releases from a subset of the foreigners. Basically, Clopton’s release 
scheme is no more than a cumbersome, if not prohibitively impractical, way to 
settle up front on overly generous terms the subsequent foreign suits that the 
signing foreigners might, or might never, have brought had they not signed. In 
return, the defendant gets little protection from subsequent suits by nonsigning and 
nonclaiming foreigners, so that the defendant who funded their unclaimed 
recoveries in the U.S. suit still bears the risk of paying again and again upon threats 
or filings of foreign suits.  
In sum, the exclusionary and inclusionary approaches constitute opposite ends 
of the spectrum of ways to address the puzzle of transnational class actions. The 
pro-defendant exclusionary approach evolved from a concern that inclusion of 
foreigners just ignored unfairness to defendants. Yet Clopton embraces the 
inclusionary approach and then appears to go beyond this spectrum by facilitating 
bounties paid by defendants for contractual release of some foreign plaintiffs’ 
claims.  
BETTER SOLUTION 
The defendant deserves a better deal than the variation on inclusion that Clopton 
offers, as long as the better deal adequately treats the class members with fairness 
and serves the public interest. The exclusionary approach is, however, too 
favorable to the defendant, coming at the expense of class members and society at 
large. It seems that the answer must lie in a middle approach between these two 
extremes. 
As the first step in my proposed compromise, I would recommend an 
inclusionary approach, so that all the foreigners would become members of the 
class in transnational class actions. Unlike an opt-in class action, this approach 
would enhance the compensatory and deterrent effects of the class action, while the 
defendant would receive whatever benefits of preclusion that exist under U.S. and 
foreign law. Incidentally, those foreigners who opt out could not use issue 
preclusion offensively.33 
As the second step, in order to get more protection for the defendant and to 
avoid the risk of overcompensation and overdeterrence, I would recommend 
creating a subclass in damages actions for the foreign claimants, but only for those 
                                                                                                             
 
 33. See supra note 16. 
76 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL SUPPLEMENT [Vol. 90:69 
 
who might have an incentive to sue again.34 The presumption would be to subclass 
the foreigners, unless the plaintiffs could show that some of them should remain in 
the main class because they would have no legal opportunity or practical incentive 
to sue abroad, as would be the case with small-stakes claimants who could not take 
advantage of a foreign class action.35 Both sides and their attorneys would therefore 
have motivation to submit to the court their information on the risk of relitigation. 
The subclass would proceed by the accepted technique of claims-made recovery.36 
If there were a recovery, the subclass members could recover only by submitting a 
proof of claim along with a release. The defendant would have to pay only those 
claims, not damages calculated to cover all potential foreign claimants in the 
subclass. Incidentally, to the extent that the attorney’s fee for class counsel turns on 
the paid recovery, the fee would be scaled back to reflect the actual recovery.37 
The details of my proposal would work this way. Those foreigners who file a 
proof of claim are precluded from filing a new claim, here or abroad. Regardless of 
the class action’s outcome, the judgment also binds those foreigners who do not file 
a proof of claim: they could not sue here in the United States under our res judicata 
                                                                                                             
 
 34. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5). 
 35. Cf. Simard & Tidmarsh, supra note 21, at 115–18, 123–28 (proposing a more 
intensive inquiry into incentives, which by their proposal would lead to exclusion of 
incentivized foreigners from the class action). 
 36. See 3 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, § 13:7:  
A “claims-made” settlement is a settlement that does not have a fixed settlement fund, 
but rather provides that the defendant will pay claims of class members who file them, 
usually up to some fixed ceiling. A “claims-made” settlement is, therefore, different 
than the more familiar “common fund” class action settlement. In a common fund 
case, a defendant contributes the settlement amount, say $100 million, into a 
settlement fund; the fund is distributed to the class directly or after a claims process. If 
the class does not claim the full $100 million, the unclaimed funds do not necessarily 
go back (or “revert”) to the defendant; they may be distributed pro rata among the 
class members who made claims, or sent to a charity via a cy pres award, or to the 
government via escheat.  
  If unclaimed funds in a common fund settlement are not returned to the defendant 
(which they rarely are), then that settlement will disgorge the defendant of the full 
amount of the fund. By contrast, in a claims made settlement, the defendant’s liability 
is never greater than the precise amount the class claims. The parties may announce a 
settlement by which the defendant “agrees to pay claims up to $100 million,” but if it 
is a claims-made settlement, that statement means very little as the class may claim no 
more than $10 million, or $1 million, etc. A claims-made settlement is, therefore, the 
functional equivalent of a common fund settlement where the unclaimed funds revert 
to the defendant. As reversionary fund settlements became more disfavored, claims-
made settlements replaced them, although the two are fully synonymous. 
  A critical feature of a claims-made settlement is that although it only pays the 
claims of class members who file them, it releases the claims of the entire class. It is 
not, therefore, the functional equivalent of an “opt-in” settlement. By releasing the 
claims of nonclaiming class members, a claims-made settlement, like most class 
action settlements, requires a class member to opt out to escape its binding effect. 
See also id. § 12:29 (extending discussion of this concept to adjudicated judgments). 
 37. See id. § 13:7. 
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law; abroad, the defendant could at least argue for recognition of the U.S. 
judgment. This relatively broad res judicata effect, as compared to the exclusionary 
approach’s effect, offsets the opportunity extended to the foreigners to claim 
damages in the U.S. court. Indeed, this approach fully serves the compensatory 
purpose of the class action. 
The defendant’s wider exposure to paying damages enhances the deterrent 
purpose of the class action as well. Indeed, the large potential exposure will 
produce a desirable in terrorem deterrence. Admittedly, my approach does not 
create as big a deterrent as a pure inclusionary approach with its award of damages 
for the whole class. But that deterrent effect goes too far. My central contention is 
that the class-action rule never intended to create a risk of loss for the defendant 
bigger than the risk of loss for the class. 
CONCLUSION 
One cannot establish the superiority of any middle course without a full cost-
benefit analysis.38 But here is a simplistic but promising start of one. This table 
compares a generally exclusionary approach and a generally inclusionary approach 
with my proposal of inclusion with a claims-made subclass of foreigners who 




  Exclusionary My Proposal Inclusionary 
 
Treats foreigners fairly  X X 
Treats the defendant fairly X X 
Tends to neither over- nor under-compensate  X 
Tends to neither over- nor under-deter  X 
Reduces risk of more lawsuits  X X 
Reduces administrative costs in class action X 
                                                                                                             
 
 38. See Simard & Tidmarsh, supra note 21, at 106–09. 
